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The judiciary plays a key role in holding the government accountable for
its socio-economic policies. By adhering to certain tenets that underlie
both South Africa’s transformative Constitution and Sen and Nussbaum’s
capabilities approach, courts can promote the foundational values of
dignity, equality and freedom, broaden participation and ensure
accountability. Since government’s priorities are most clearly reflected in
its budgetary allocations, courts should apply a capabilities-based
standard of proportionality review where it is claimed that a socio-
economic right has been violated due to disproportionate resource
allocation. In this article, the focus shifts to the implications of adopting a
capabilities approach at the remedial phase of adjudication. Given that
the South African Constitution demands ‘effective’ relief where a
constitutional right has been infringed, it is argued that efficacy can be
assessed by a remedy’s ability to realise the capabilities that form the
content of the infringed socio-economic right. Furthermore, where socio-
economic rights are infringed upon on a systemic level through
unreasonable resource allocation, key principles that inform a capabilities
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approach to adjudication can be incorporated into the design of structural
interdicts to ensure lasting capability realisation and institutional reform.
Where all these principles are observed, effective relief can ensue. Finally,
the incorporation of these principles into remedial design can help mitigate
separation of powers-based concerns that the judiciary lacks the
institutional competence and legitimacy required to adjudicate complex,
polycentric matters of government resource allocation. 
Key words: socio-economic rights; South African Constitution; effective
remedies; capabilities approach 
1 Introduction 
Justiciable socio-economic rights mean little without domestic legal
systems that afford access to effective remedies for rights violations.1
While most international and regional human rights instruments
oblige state parties to fulfil human rights and provide remedies where
violations are alleged,2 many national jurisdictions lack a principled
basis on which to formulate effective relief. Drawing from the South
African Constitutional Court and other jurisprudence, this article
proposes a paradigm for use by the judiciary to craft effective
remedies while not encroaching upon the separation of powers
doctrine. The conceptual framework draws from tenets common to
both South Africa’s transformative Constitution and Sen and
1 South Africa recently faced a crisis in its social security administration which
exposed millions of vulnerable grant beneficiaries to the complete denial of their
right to social assistance, as guaranteed by sec 27 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996. The predicament arose after a 2014 judgment of
the Constitutional Court that the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)
had run an unlawful tender process for the administration of social grants by a
third party provider; Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief
Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC)
(Allpay I). In order not to jeopardise the vital interest that grant beneficiaries have
in uninterrupted grant payment, the resultant declaration of invalidity was
suspended until a new tender process was run, or SASSA took over the
administration of grants at the expiration of the invalid contract on 31 March
2017; Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of
the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC) (Allpay II).
However, the Constitutional Court subsequently on several occasions had to
intervene to further extend the operation of the contract due to non-performance
and false assurances provided by SASSA. Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social
Development (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 2017 (3) SA 335 (CC) (Black
Sash I); South African Social Security Agency v Minister of Social Development 2018
10 BCLR 1291 (CC) (SASSA); Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development
(Freedom Under Law Intervening) 2018 12 BCLR 1472 (CC) (Black Sash II). 
2 In the African regional context, see art 7(1)(a) of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights. See further M Ssenyonjo ‘Analysing the economic, social and
cultural rights jurisprudence of the African Commission: 30 Years since the
adoption of the African Charter’ (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights
358 371.
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Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.3 The Constitution seeks to
‘[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of
each person’,4 whereas the capabilities approach congruently asks to
what extent people have the potential (or substantive freedom) to
choose the lives they have reason to value.5 This framework may be
adapted for use by African jurisdictions that entrench justiciable socio-
economic rights,6 and may further aid other jurisdictions that do not
yet provide for effective remedies where socio-economic rights are
infringed.7 Whereas judicial intervention is ultimately no panacea in
the face of systemic government intransigence, a sound theoretical
grounding nevertheless makes effective relief possible. 
The article builds on previous research studies that sought to
demonstrate that the adoption of a capabilities approach to
adjudication practically can assist and theoretically justify the South
African judiciary’s review of government resource allocation decisions
that impact socio-economic rights.8 Since government’s priorities are
most clearly reflected in its budgetary allocations, courts should apply
a capabilities-based standard of proportionality review where it is
claimed that a socio-economic right has been violated due to
disproportionate resource allocation.9 In the article the focus shifts to
the implications of adopting a capabilities approach at the remedial
phase of adjudication of government resource allocation decisions
that impact socio-economic rights. Given that the Constitution
demands ‘effective’ relief where a constitutional right has been
infringed, it is argued that efficacy can be assessed by a remedy’s
ability to realise the capabilities that form the content of the infringed
socio-economic right. Where socio-economic rights are infringed
upon on a systemic level through unreasonable resource allocation,
key principles that inform a capabilities approach to adjudication can
be incorporated into the design of structural interdicts to ensure
lasting capability realisation and institutional reform. 
3 A Sen Development as freedom (1999); A Sen The idea of justice (2009);
MC Nussbaum Women and human development: The capabilities approach (2000);
MC Nussbaum Creating capabilities (2011).
4 Preamble to the South African Constitution. 
5 Sen (1999) (n 3) 74.
6 Eg, the Constitution of Ghana (1992) and the Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
7 See eg the case of Cameroon, as expanded in AA Agbor ‘Pursuing the right to an
effective remedy for human rights violation in Cameroon: The need for legislative
reform’ (2017) 20 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 27. 
8 See generally S van der Berg ‘A capabilities approach to the judicial review of
resource allocation decisions impacting on socio-economic rights’ unpublished
LLD thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2015; S van der Berg ‘The need for a
capabilities-based standard of review for the adjudication of state resource
allocation decisions’ (2015) 31 South African Journal on Human Rights 330;
S van der Berg ‘Ensuring proportionate state resource allocation in socio-economic
rights cases’ (2017) 134 South African Law Journal 576.
9 For the need to apply a capabilities-based standard of review, see Van der Berg
(2015) (n 8).
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First, courts should direct a process of participation and
informational broadening to ensure that the capability needs
underlying the violated socio-economic rights are comprehensively
determined. Next, courts must provide explicit normative guidelines to
guide government and all stakeholders in their engagement efforts
with a view to formulating improved allocative plans. Simultaneously,
courts should require government to present explicit evidence of the
processes followed to arrive at a proportionate remedial plan. Finally,
the revisability of judgments should be catered for by retaining
judicial supervision. Where all these principles are observed, effective
relief can ensue. Moreover, the incorporation of these principles into
remedial design can help mitigate separation of powers-based
concerns that the judiciary lacks the institutional competence and
legitimacy required to adjudicate complex, polycentric matters of
government resource allocation. 
The article commences with an exposition of the South African
judiciary’s remedial powers by highlighting key jurisprudential
examples that illustrate the range of remedies at courts’ disposal. It is
subsequently argued that the judiciary should overcome its ostensible
reluctance to retain supervision following findings of socio-economic
violations, and suggests that participatory structural interdicts may
strike an appropriate balance between the need for effective relief and
maintenance of the separation of powers between different branches
of government. Finally, a capabilities approach to remedies is
espoused. 
2 South African judiciary’s remedial powers 
2.1 A capabilities approach to remedies in the context of South 
Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism 
South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the world,
and over half of its population continues to live in poverty.10 It is
within this context that South Africa’s Constitution should be viewed.
South Africa’s project of ‘transformative constitutionalism’ envisions a
process of ‘constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement
committed … to transforming a country’s political and social
institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory,
and egalitarian direction’.11 In order to achieve a substantively equal
society, the realisation of the various socio-economic rights enshrined
in the Constitution is essential.12 This, in turn, requires significant
resources to be expended by government in order to redress the
10 Stats SA Poverty trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between
2006 and 2015 (2017) 17. 
11 KE Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South
African Journal on Human Rights 146 150.
12 Eg secs 26, 27, 28 & 29 of the Constitution. 
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systemic and infrastructural imbalances inherited from South Africa’s
apartheid past. Constitutional transformation furthermore requires a
shift from a ‘culture of authority’ to a ‘culture of justification’, in terms
of which the exercise of public power must be justified with reference
to value-based reasons.13 
The capabilities approach of Sen and Nussbaum, which centres on
the question as to whether people possess the substantive freedom or
‘capabilities’ to choose meaningful lives, resonates strongly with South
Africa’s constitutional project, in general, and the inclusion of
justiciable socio-economic rights, in particular. It has been
demonstrated elsewhere that the capabilities approach can assist
courts in imbuing socio-economic rights with context-dependent
content, thereby aiding the judiciary in subjecting impugned
government allocative decisions to proportionality review.14
Moreover, it has been shown that certain tenets central to both South
Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism and the capabilities
approach can be distilled and applied throughout the adjudicatory
process.15 Where courts are tasked with formulating effective
remedies for systemic, disproportionate government resource
allocation that results in the infringement of socio-economic rights,
three of these principles become particularly relevant: First,
participation is crucial to a project of transformative
constitutionalism,16 and finds its corollary in Sen’s emphasis on public
reasoning and informational broadening.17 Next, substantive
reasoning on the part of all public actors, including the judiciary, is
integral to a culture of justification,18 and is congruent with the
requirement for explicitness in the making of evaluative judgments in
terms of the capabilities approach.19 Finally, these tenets must be
combined with judicial supervision in order to ensure effective
remedies. Supervision enables revisable judgments, for which the
need is recognised by Sen.20
The capabilities approach, therefore, can inform the judicial
implementation of South Africa’s project of transformative
constitutionalism, and contribute to the formulation of effective relief
13 E Mureinik ‘A Bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10
South African Journal on Human Rights 31 32.
14 See Van der Berg (2015) (n 8). 
15 Van der Berg (2017) (n 8) 576.
16 P Langa ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 351
354; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative
constitution (2010) 29 32.
17 Sen (1999) (n 3) 56-57, 110, 274, 284; Sen (2009) (n 3) 44. 
18 Mureinik (n 13) 32; M Pieterse ‘What do we mean when we talk about
transformative constitutionalism?’ (2005) 20 South African Public Law 155 156 161
165; Langa (n 16) 353. 
19 Sen (1999) (n 3) 30, 75; Sen (2009) (n 3) 4 109-110. 
20 S Fredman Human rights transformed: Positive rights and positive duties (2008) 109;
Sen (2009) (n 3) 107. 
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where socio-economic rights are infringed on a systemic level through
unreasonable resource allocation. 
2.2 Remedial powers under the Constitution
The South African judiciary enjoys wide remedial powers under the
Constitution. Anyone who enjoys locus standi in terms of the broad
provision in section 38 ‘has the right to approach a competent court,
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or
threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a
declaration of rights’.21 Where a socio-economic right is infringed by
a resource allocation decision, courts are empowered to grant
‘appropriate’ relief. A capabilities approach to remedies implies that
‘appropriate’ relief must be relief aimed at the realisation of the
capabilities which the relevant infringed socio-economic right
protects.22 The Constitution and a capabilities approach to
adjudication justify the judiciary’s remedial competence, even where
relief calls for increased resource allocation, or for institutional reform
in order to ensure effective resource allocation.23 Section 172 of the
Constitution expands on the remedial powers of the courts:
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court – 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the
Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including – 
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of
invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any
period and on any conditions, to allow the competent
authority to correct the defect.
Where resource allocation is disproportionate to the socio-economic
capabilities at stake, the unjustifiable infringement of a socio-
economic right occurs. Courts are obliged under section 172(1)(a) to
declare such allocative decision invalid. However, a declaration of
invalidity runs the risk of leading to polycentric results. It would
accordingly be ‘just and equitable’ to suspend such a declaration of
invalidity24 and to couple such order with a structural interdict25 to
allow government to formulate a plan to rectify an unconstitutional
resource allocation decision and thereby fulfil the infringed socio-
economic right. By conceptualising of the structural interdict as a
flexible remedy that grants the state leeway to conceive suitable
21 Sec 38 Constitution. 
22 For the relationship between capabilities and functionings, see Sen (1999) (n 3)
75. 
23 Sen (1999) (n 3) 141-143. 
24 Sec 172(1)(b)(ii) Constitution. 
25 For the potential of the structural interdict to mitigate polycentric effects and
effect capability realisation, see further part 3.2 below. 
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remedial plans, relief of this nature may deter courts from invoking
the separation of powers doctrine to limit their remedial obligations.26 
2.3 Remedial approach of the Constitutional Court in qualified 
socio-economic rights cases 
Where qualified socio-economic rights are at issue, the availability of
resources – and the reasonableness of allocative decisions – always are
of central significance. This is due to the fact that the rights of access
to adequate housing, health care services, sufficient food and water,
and social assistance, are all subject to the constitutional qualification
that the state should take reasonable measures, within its available
resources, to progressively realise each of these rights.27 Therefore, it is
instructive to analyse the Constitutional Court’s approach to remedies
where complex, polycentric matters of resource allocation were at
issue. 
2.3.1 The potential inefficiency of declaratory orders
In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom28
(Grootboom case), the Court issued a declaratory order regarding the
constitutional shortcomings of the state’s housing policy.29 This
judgment thus is a prime example of pitfalls that may accompany the
issuing of declaratory orders where systemic shortcomings go beyond
mere government inattentiveness in formulating socio-economic
policy.30 In terms of the declaratory relief issued, the Court held that
‘[s]ection 26(2) of the Constitution requires the state to devise and
implement within its available resources a comprehensive and
coordinated programme progressively to realise the right of access to
adequate housing’.31 Regrettably, the order was not expeditiously
implemented and a delay of over three years ensued before the state
devised a revised housing policy that catered for those in urgent
need.32 During this period all persons ‘in desperate need’33 of
26 CC Ngang ‘Judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa and the
separation of powers objection: The obligation to take “other measures”’ (2014)
14 African Human Rights Law Journal 655.
27 Secs 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution both qualify the various socio-economic
rights set out in secs 26(1) and 27(1), respectively. 
28 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
29 The Constitutional Court previously made the negotiated settlement between the
parties an order of court, dated 21 September 2000 (on file with author) which
was implemented to a certain extent. K Pillay ‘Implementing Grootboom:
Supervision Needed’ (2002) 3 ESR Review 13 14; Liebenberg (n 16) 401. 
30 For the circumstances in which declaratory orders may constitute effective relief,
and for further examples of the use of declaratory orders by South African courts,
see P Swanepoel ‘The potential of structural interdicts to constitute effective relief
in socio-economic rights cases’ unpublished LLM dissertation, University of
Stellenbosch, 2017 64-69. 
31 Grootboom (n 28) para 99. 
32 Liebenberg (n 16) 401-403. 
33 Grootboom (n 28) para 52. 
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temporary housing continued to live in ‘intolerable conditions’,34
without access to any type of shelter. It is clear that in such conditions
severe basic capability deprivation occurs.35 Not even elementary
functioning outcomes,36 such as possessing adequate shelter,
enjoying basic services or attaining a basic state of good health, can
be achieved in such circumstances. In this case, a capabilities
approach to a remedy would thus have required the participation of
all stakeholders to identify the capability needs at stake and respond
accordingly. Moreover, the retention of supervision may have helped
to ensure that the state revised its programme expeditiously. The
retention of supervision would have been justified in light of the grave
capability deprivation that occurred in the absence of provision for
emergency housing relief. 
2.3.2 A reluctance to retain supervision 
Subsequently, in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2)
(TAC case)37 the Constitutional Court clarified that, contrary to the
state’s arguments, courts are not limited to issuing declaratory orders
only:38 
There is … no merit in the argument advanced on behalf of government
that a distinction should be drawn between declaratory and mandatory
orders against government. Even simple declaratory orders against
government or organs of state can affect their policy and may well have
budgetary implications. Government is constitutionally bound to give
effect to such orders whether or not they affect its policy and has to find the
resources to do so. 
In terms of TAC, courts are therefore empowered to grant orders that
affect policy and resource allocation,39 while remaining sensitive to
the institutional roles of the different branches of government under
the separation of powers doctrine.40 According to the Court, where
the nature of the right infringed, the nature of the infringement41 and
the circumstances of the particular case so demand, ‘courts may – and
if need be must – use their wide powers to make orders that affect
policy as well as legislation’.42 The Court concluded that structural
34 As above. 
35 Sen (1999) (n 3) 20 perceives poverty as constituting basic capability deprivation. 
36 ‘Functionings’ represent achievements or what a person can actually do, whereas
capability sets represent the substantive freedom to choose different functioning
combinations. Capabilities, therefore, constitute the real opportunities that people
have to realise various lifestyles, rather than the choices they actually make.
‘Functionings’ represent a supple concept, which can include basic states of being
(eg being adequately nourished) as well as more complex states of being (eg
being able to participate effectively in community life). Sen (1999) (n 3) 75.
37 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
38 TAC (n 37) para 99 (my emphasis).
39 TAC para 99.
40 TAC para 113. 
41 TAC para 106.
42 TAC para 113.
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interdicts do not breach the separation of powers doctrine,
‘particularly when the state’s obligations are not performed diligently
and without delay’.43 
However, in issuing declaratory and mandatory orders, the Court
again declined to retain supervisory jurisdiction, stating that a
structural interdict was unnecessary since ‘government has always
respected and executed orders’ of the Court.44 TAC concerned
government policy in respect of the provision of anti-retroviral
medication to HIV positive, pregnant mothers, and thus engaged the
right of access to adequate health care services. Given the delayed
implementation of a revised housing policy in Grootboom, and certain
provinces’ recalcitrance in implementing the orders made in TAC,45
the Court’s reluctance to issue a structural interdict was inapt. In casu,
the failure to provide immediate and effective relief would lead to the
deaths of a significant number of HIV-infected infants and the
capability deprivation of an exceptionally vulnerable group (infants)
would be absolute. The urgent necessity of protecting these vital
capabilities, therefore, would have justified a capabilities approach to
a remedy in the form of a structural interdict. 
3 Overcoming the judicial reluctance to issue 
structural interdicts in qualified socio-economic 
rights cases 
3.1 Constitutional and institutional competence 
From the above discussion it emerges that the Constitutional Court
has been reluctant to grant structural remedies (or to delegate this
function to the High Courts) in cases where qualified socio-economic
rights were at issue.46 Instead, the Court has seemingly
conceptualised the structural interdict as a ‘remedy of last resort’47
43 TAC para 112. 
44 TAC para 129. This judgment is illustrative and not the only instance where a
South African court has declined to retain jurisdiction. 
45 K Roach & G Budlender ‘Mandatory relief and supervisory jurisdiction: When is it
appropriate, just and equitable’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 325
333-334; C Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa (2012) 562-563. 
46 In contrast, the Constitutional Court has issued supervisory remedies in cases
where the unqualified right to education, enshrined in sec 29(1)(a) of the
Constitution, was at stake. Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v
Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC). The Court has also asserted its competence to
issue mandatory orders and retain supervision in cases where civil and political
rights were at stake. See August v Electoral Commission 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC);
Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention 2005 (3) SA 280
(CC) (voting rights of prisoners) and Sibiya v Director of Public Prosecutions:
Johannesburg 2005 (5) SA 315 (CC) (replacement of death sentences with
appropriate forms of punishment).
47 TAC (n 37) paras 112 & 129. 
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only to be granted ‘where governments are incompetent or
intransigent with respect to the implementation of rights’.48 
3.1.1 Judicial responsibility for the granting of effective relief 
Davis ascribes the judicial reluctance to grant managerial remedies
where qualified socio-economic rights are concerned to the same
factor arguably responsible for the Court’s resort to a ‘proceduralised’,
normatively weak model of reasonableness review,49 namely, the
Court’s hesitancy to encroach upon the terrain of the executive or
legislative branches of government.50 The Supreme Court of Appeal
has also voiced its separation of powers-based concerns regarding the
structural interdict:51
Structural interdicts … have a tendency to blur the distinction between the
executive and the judiciary and impact on the separation of powers. They
tend to deal with policy matters and not with the enforcement of particular
rights … Then there is the problem of sensible enforcement: the state must
be able to comply with the order within the limits of its capabilities,
financial or otherwise.
However, it must be borne in mind that the separation of powers
allocates adjudicative responsibility to the judiciary. This includes the
power to grant effective remedies. In Allpay II, in which the
Constitutional Court issued what it termed a structural interdict52 in
respect of the running of a new tender process for the payment of
social security grants, the Court emphasised this point:53
There can be no doubt that the separation of powers attributes
responsibility to the courts for ensuring that unconstitutional conduct is
declared invalid and that constitutionally mandated remedies are afforded
for violations of the Constitution. This means that the Court must provide
effective relief for infringements of constitutional rights.
48 Roach & Budlender (n 45) 327. Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a
Metrorail 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC) para 109. 
49 D Brand ‘The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights
jurisprudence, or “What are socio-economic rights for?”’ in H Botha, A van der
Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and democracy in a transformative constitution
(2003) 33. 
50 D Davis ‘Adjudicating the socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution:
Towards “Deference Lite”?’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 301
311. See further S van der Berg ‘Meaningful engagement: Proceduralising socio-
economic rights further or infusing administrative law with substance?’ (2013) 29
South African Journal on Human Rights 376 382. 
51 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of
South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) (Modderklip)
para 39.
52 Allpay II (n 1) para 71. 
53 Allpay II para 42. 
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3.1.2  The structural interdict as an effective and participatory 
remedy
The structural interdict potentially embodies an effective and
participatory remedy that can overcome traditional concerns that
courts lack the constitutional and institutional competence required to
adjudicate complex resource allocation decisions. By accommodating
these concerns at the remedial stage of adjudication, the need for
deference in applying a capabilities-based standard of review to
allocative decisions is obviated. 
Legitimacy concerns are mitigated by conceptualising the structural
remedy as a dialogic engagement among all stakeholders, including
the legislature. Stakeholders thus express their agency through
participation, and simultaneously influence the formulation of public
policy that can potentially lead to new legislation. This possibility was
recognised in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National
Assembly54 in the context of participation in the legislative process:55 
The participation by the public on a continuous basis provides vitality to
the functioning of representative democracy … It enhances the civic
dignity of those who participate by enabling their voices to be heard and
taken account of. It promotes a spirit of democratic and pluralistic
accommodation calculated to produce laws that are likely to be widely
accepted and effective in practice. It strengthens the legitimacy of
legislation in the eyes of the people.
Furthermore, a structural interdict affords leeway to the executive to
design a plan for the procurement of additional resources aimed at
capability realisation, or for the effective implementation of existing
allocations.56 Besides the government’s recalcitrance in adhering to
court orders or cases where non-compliance would cause irremediable
damage,57 Roach and Budlender identify a third situation where the
structural interdict would be appropriately granted. According to the
authors, courts should feel fortified in granting a managerial remedy
where a mandatory order is stated in general terms, due to the nature
of the duty involved58 or the need to grant the state as much latitude
as possible to devise its own plan.59 This may be the case where
54 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC).
55 Doctors for Life International (n 54) para 115. 
56 Roach & Budlender (n 45) 334. 
57 Where basic capability deprivation occurs due to unreasonable resource allocation,
non-compliance with a court order will potentially lead to irremediable damage.
Black Sash I (n 1) serves as an example of government recalcitrance and where
non-compliance would have left millions of social grant beneficiaries destitute. 
58 Eg to allocate ‘reasonable’ or ‘proportionate’ resources to the fulfilment of a socio-
economic right. However, see part 4.2 below regarding the importance of
explicitness both in granting a structural interdict (explicitness on the part of the
court) and complying therewith (explicitness on the part of the state). 
59 Roach & Budlender (n 45) 334. In Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v
Government of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (5) SA 87 (WCC) the Court stated
that ‘[s]uch relief … is appropriate when the court does not wish to prescribe to
the respondent the detail of what steps must be taken’ (para 50).
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broad structural reform is necessary, or where the remediation of the
law or conduct in question raises complex, polycentric issues. The
authors explain the benefit of a structural interdict to the state in such
instances:60 
It may provide governments with a timeline to follow. The approval of a
plan by the court can allow the government to move forward with the
implementation of its plan secure in the knowledge that implementation
will constitute compliance with its obligations. The court can make an
order which is as non-intrusive as possible on the choices which the elected
government makes, because it can be secure in the knowledge that this
will not be an invitation to non-compliance but rather an invitation to the
government to formulate a plan in order to achieve compliance with the
Constitution.
Allowing the state latitude ensures that the executive can devise a
plan with which it can comply within the limits of its financial
capacity. A capabilities-infused structural interdict, therefore, can
complement a fluid conceptualisation of the separation of powers
doctrine.61 Rodríguez-Garavito elaborates: ‘Dialogic judgments tend
to outline procedures and broad goals and, in line with the principle
of separation of powers, place the burden on government agencies to
design and implement policies.’62
By affording the state the discretion to devise an allocative plan in
consultation63 with a broad range of stakeholders, concerns regarding
the judiciary’s competence to review allocative decisions can be
addressed at the remedial stage of adjudication. 
3.2 Polycentricity
The polycentricity inherent in state resource allocation decisions is
often highlighted as a bar to their justiciability.64 Nevertheless, in
August the Constitutional Court held: ‘We cannot deny strong actual
claims timeously asserted by determinate people, because of the
possible existence of hypothetical claims that might conceivably have
been brought by indeterminate groups.’65
Yet the potential of a decision to result in unknown ramifications for
a complex web of other issues is increased in proportion to the range
60 Roach & Budlender (n 45) 334. 
61 Liebenberg (n 16) 436; CF Sabel & WH Simon ‘Destabilisation rights: How public
law litigation succeeds’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law Review 1016 1090.
62 C Rodríguez-Garavito ‘Beyond the courtroom: The impact of judicial activism on
socio-economic rights in Latin America’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1669 1691. 
63 See part 4.1 below. 
64 L Fuller ‘The forms and limits of adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353
394. Resource allocation decisions are polycentric, since a judgment on a specific
instance of resource allocation could result in unforeseen consequences for other
budgetary allocations. Unforeseen consequences for budgetary allocations could
result where groups in need of resources are left unrepresented in litigation. 
65 August (n 46) para 30. 
302                                                             (2019) 19 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
of interests not represented before a court.66 At the remedial stage of
adjudication, ‘[f]airness requires a consideration of the interests of all
those who might be affected by the order’.67 However, given that
increased budgetary allocation can impact on different votes in the
national budget and even on the macro-economic obligations of the
state, it will seldom be possible to accommodate all the interests at
stake. Nevertheless, the emphasis that a capabilities approach to
adjudication places on informational broadening can significantly
extend the scope of represented interests.68 The information available
to the court for the formulation of an appropriate remedy can be
expanded through, for example, the use of amicus curiae interventions
or the consideration of other expert evidence. An even wider array of
perspectives can be incorporated into remedial design by requiring
the state to engage with a broad range of stakeholders and report
back to the court. 
Moreover, the latitude afforded to the state to formulate a
constitutionally compliant allocative plan, coupled with the retention
of supervision, promotes the flexibility needed to cater for
adjustments in light of the materialisation of initially unforeseen
consequences. The Constitutional Court has observed that ‘any
planning which leaves no scope whatsoever for relatively marginal
adjustments in the light of evolving reality, may often not be
reasonable’.69 The polycentric nature of resource allocation decisions
can therefore be accommodated by the granting of structural
interdicts which allow for changes in allocative plans as circumstances
change. 
Sabel and Simon further point out the capacity of ‘experimentalist’
remedies, including structural interdicts, to deal with polycentric
effects as they arise:70 
Just as the court’s liability determination destabilizes relations and practices
within the defendant institution, so does it ramify to other institutions and
practices. These ramifications … are the web effect. The web effect makes
it possible to address sequentially – in a sequence determined in the course
of problem-solving itself – reforms too complex to be addressed whole.
This effect is polycentricity viewed as an aid, not an obstacle, to problem
solving.
The retention of supervision therefore allows a court to modify its
orders sequentially, as circumstances change or initially unavailable
information comes to light. Without the retention of supervision and
the establishment of a dialogic relationship between the court and
other branches of government, unforeseen consequences of a
particular court order cannot be accommodated. A traditional
66 C Mbazira ‘Confronting the problem of polycentricity in enforcing socio-economic
rights in the South African Constitution’ (2008) 23 South African Public Law 30 41.
67 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 43 (my emphasis). 
68 See part 4.1 below. 
69 Modderklip (n 51) para 49.
70 Sabel & Simon (n 61) 1080.
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remedy, such as a simple mandatory order without the retention of
supervision, does not allow for similar flexibility. However, the
flexibility inherent in the structural interdict must be combined with
explicit normative parameters, set by the court, in order to ensure
constitutional resource allocation decisions.71 
4 A capabilities approach to remedies
A capabilities approach to remedies posits that where the
infringement of a socio-economic right entails the deprivation of
critical capabilities, a remedy that can effectively vindicate those
capabilities is required. Whereas the remedy will thus be directed at
remediating the infringement of the socio-economic right, its
effectiveness can be measured by its success in realising the
capabilities underlying the right. 
The structural interdict can be designed so as to incorporate three
capabilities-based features that are mutually reinforcing and
conducive to effective relief: First, the structural interdict can facilitate
participation by a wide range of stakeholders. Second, any order that
compels the state to engage with stakeholders and respond
accordingly can be accompanied by explicit normative guidelines that
outline the broad contours of what proportionate resource allocation
may necessitate. Finally, the retention of supervision will allow the
court to monitor compliance with its orders, and to revise its orders as
needed in light of the challenges identified by an ongoing process of
participation. 
All three features of a capabilities approach to the structural
interdict are mutually supporting and combine to encapsulate an
effective remedy. The features will thus overlap with each other
during the remedial process. First, a court will facilitate participation
prior to issuing an initial order. The first order will be accompanied by
explicit normative guidelines. A process of participation will then
continue among the state and various other stakeholders. The results
of the participatory process may in turn require the court to adapt its
initial normative guidelines. The retention of supervision makes an
ongoing process of participation and the revision of orders possible. 
4.1 Participation and informational broadening
Under South African’s transformative Constitution, participation
should be promoted in all spheres of government and in any decision
that may have an impact on rights.72 Participation thus is a key
foundational requirement that should be facilitated by the judiciary as
71 For a discussion regarding the importance of explicit, normative parameters in
granting a structural remedy, see part 4.2 below. 
72 Klare (n 11) 155; D Brand ‘Judicial deference and democracy in socio-economic
rights cases in South Africa’ (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 614 622-623. 
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part of a collaborative partnership with other branches of the state,73
aimed at the realisation of the ideals encapsulated by the
Constitution. Participation is also a central tenet of a capabilities
approach to adjudication, in that it fosters the agency of those whose
capabilities are affected by state allocative decisions.74 Participatory
capabilities75 are intrinsically valuable. They are also instrumentally
important in that participation can shape the government’s allocative
policy and so lead to the realisation of other capabilities that are
prerequisites for meaningful participation in the social, economic and
political milieu. 
The informational base used for making evaluative judgments,
likewise, is of central significance to the capabilities theory.76 Thus, a
capabilities approach to adjudication uses the informational base of
capabilities as the measure against which resource allocation as well as
remedial effectiveness can be judged. For remedial action to be
effective, capability needs in a given contextual setting as well as the
potential means for meeting such needs must be identified. The
information must be sufficient to demonstrate the costs of remedying
capability deprivation, as well as the resources potentially at the state’s
disposal for this purpose. The information available to a court and the
state for the formulation and implementation of a remedy must thus
be broadened to the greatest extent practicable. 
A capabilities approach to the emphasis of remedies on
informational broadening through participatory processes resonates
strongly with Rodríguez-Garavito’s proposal for strongly interpreted
rights, dialogic remedies and strong monitoring:77
Dialogic decisions tend to open a monitoring process that encourages
discussion of policy alternatives to solve the structural problem detected in
the ruling … the minutiae of the policies arise during the course of the
monitoring process, not in the judgment itself … [T]his constitutional
dialogue involves a broader spectrum of stakeholders in the monitoring
process. In addition to the court and state agencies directly affected by the
judgment, implementation involves victims whose rights have been
violated, relevant civil-society organizations, international human rights
agencies, and other actors whose participation is useful.
It is thus through a process of informational broadening – starting in
the courtroom,78 expanding to other stakeholders and returning to
73 For a discussion of a collaborative partnership between all branches of
government in the Indian context, see People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union
of India 1983 1 SCR 456 469.
74 For the importance of agency, see Sen (1999) (n 3) 19 38-41 53. 
75 Participatory capabilities are those related to social, economic and political
participation. 
76 For the importance of informational broadening and participation, see Sen (1999)
(n 3) 56-57.
77 Rodríguez-Garavito (n 62) 1691-1692. 
78 Participation should be observed in the exercise of all public power, including the
drafting of legislation and formulation of policies related to resource allocation.
Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as
Amicus Curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para 625. Participation in the allocative
REMEDIES FOR SYSTEMIC RESOURCE-RELATED SE RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SA     305
the courtroom for approval and normative guidance – that
capabilities-focused allocative choices can be ensured. 
4.1.1 Informational broadening in the courtroom 
Informational broadening must commence in court in order to
effectively apply a capabilities-based standard of review, and to
formulate an appropriate remedy aimed at achieving proportionate
resource allocation. Where relevant capabilities and interests are not
considered, allocative policy may remain under-inclusive or ineffective.
By assimilating a multitude of perspectives, the formulation of an
effective remedy directed at proportionate resource allocation is
possible.79 
One way in which the judiciary can initiate the process of
informational broadening is to direct the joinder of all relevant parties.
Joinder will be appropriate where a party has a substantial interest in
the matter.80 Joinder furthermore can circumvent problems related to
legitimacy and institutional competence by allowing relevant organs
of state to participate in matters within their expertise.81 By citing the
national and provincial governments at the initiation of the
proceedings, provision can be made for the inclusion of all relevant
organs of state while fostering intergovernmental participation and
accountability.82 The non-joinder of parties with an interest in the
adjudication of state resource allocation decisions can thus have a
critical bearing on the possibility of an effective remedy.83 
Another way in which informational broadening can occur in the
courtroom is by drawing from the Indian Supreme Court’s experience
in appointing commissions to provide information, help in the design
of remedies and monitor implementation where necessary.84 The
Constitutional Court recently appointed a panel of experts to monitor
78 process will thus be one factor a court should consider in applying a capabilities-
based standard of review. Once a resource allocation decision is found to be
unreasonable or disproportionate, thus infringing a socio-economic right,
participation as informational broadening again becomes crucial. 
79 Mbazira (n 66) 43.
80 G Muller ‘The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters
in South African law’ unpublished LLD thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2011
231. See further G Muller & S Liebenberg ‘Developing the law of joinder in the
context of evictions of people from their homes’ (2013) 29 South African Journal
on Human Rights 554.
81 Mabaso v Law Society, Northern Provinces 2005 (2) SA 117 (CC) para 13.
82 Eg, ‘the government of the Republic of South Africa’ and the ‘Premier of the
Province of the Western Cape’ were cited in Grootboom (n 28). A similar approach
was followed in Madzodzo v Minister of Basic Education 2014 (3) SA 441 (ECM). 
83 Rule 8(1) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court GN R1675 in GG 25726 of
31 October 2003 states: ‘Any person entitled to join as a party or liable to be
joined as a party in the proceedings may, on notice to all parties, at any stage of
the proceedings apply for leave to intervene as a party.’
84 PN Bhagwati ‘Judicial activism and public interest litigation’ (1985) 23 Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 561 575-577; J Cassels ‘Judicial activism and public
interest litigation in India: Attempting the impossible?’ (1989) 37 American Journal
of Comparative Law 495 500 506.
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the payment of social grants and SASSA’s progress in making
adequate arrangements for the distribution of social grants in the
future.85 
In addition, amicus curiae interventions constitute a valuable
mechanism for broadening the information available to the reviewing
court and the state in order to formulate effective remedies.86 An
amicus curiae ‘acts in the interests of the broader society rather than of
specific individuals, focusing on the broader implications of a case’.87
Amici curiae can thus alert the court and state to any overlooked and
unrepresented interests. They may also identify at least some of the
polycentric effects that might result from ordering the state to devise
and implement reasonable allocative decisions.88 In Allpay II the
Constitutional Court highlighted the multi-dimensional approach
necessary to formulate a ‘just and equitable’ remedy and the Court’s
inability to identify all the interests that may be affected by its order.89
In casu, one of the amici curiae’s submissions that any order made
should not result in the interruption of social grants was duly noted by
the Court.90 The amicus curiae, therefore, brought the capabilities of
the unrepresented grant beneficiaries squarely into focus for the Court
to consider in formulating an appropriate remedy. 
Courts may further utilise provisions that allow for the appointment
of expert referees with the consent of the parties in technical,
complex and polycentric matters such as those related to resource
allocation.91 The findings of such referees can subsequently be
incorporated into the normative guidelines issued by a court along
with a participatory remedy and the retention of supervision. Finally,
courts can order the formulation of specialised task forces to
investigate the allocative needs of litigants and those similarly placed,
in order for any resultant resource allocation decision to be
proportionate to the capability needs thus identified.92 
85 SASSA (n 1). 
86 Rule 10 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court GN R1675 in GG 25726 of
31 October 2003 makes provision for amicus curiae interventions. 
87 L Chenwi ‘Litigating socio-economic rights through amicus briefs’ (2009) 10 ESR
Review 7 8.
88 See further Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 9;
Hoffmann (n 67) para 63; M Heywood ‘Debunking “conglomo talk”: A case study
of the amicus curiae as an instrument for advocacy, investigation and mobilisation’
(2001) 5 Law, Democracy and Development 133.
89 Allpay II (n 1) paras 39-40. 
90 Allpay II para 27. 
91 Sec 19bis of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959; J Fowkes ‘How to open the doors
of the court: Lessons on access to justice from Indian PIL’ (2011) 27 South African
Journal on Human Rights 434 457; D Butterworth, J d’Oliviera & C de Moor ‘Are
South African administrative law procedures adequate for the evaluation of issues
resting on scientific analyses?’ (2012) 129 South African Law Journal 461 476 n 42.
92 See Madzodzo (n 82), where a dedicated Furniture Task Force was established in
order to identify the furniture needs of the relevant schools. This enabled an
estimation of the budgetary resources required to meet said needs. 
REMEDIES FOR SYSTEMIC RESOURCE-RELATED SE RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SA     307
4.1.2 Informational broadening among the state and other 
stakeholders 
In addition to fostering participation in the courtroom, courts can
issue participatory remedies in combination with explicit normative
guidelines and the retention of supervision.93 One of the most
promising developments in socio-economic rights jurisprudence is the
innovation of requiring meaningful engagement both as a
prerequisite for reasonable socio-economic policy and as a remedy in
appropriate cases.94 In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers95
Sachs J stated:96
[T]he procedural and substantive aspects of justice and equity cannot
always be separated. The managerial role of the courts may need to find
expression in innovative ways. Thus one potentially dignified and effective
mode of achieving sustainable reconciliations of the different interests
involved is to encourage and require the parties to engage with each other
in a pro-active and honest endeavour to find mutually acceptable solutions.
Meaningful engagement was first utilised as a remedy in Occupiers of
51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v
City of Johannesburg.97 In this case the Constitutional Court issued an
interim order for the City of Johannesburg to engage meaningfully
with potential evictees from buildings that posed a health and safety
risk. The Court linked the duty to engage meaningfully with several
constitutional duties owed to occupiers that are intricately connected
to the fundamental rights of dignity and life.98
Meaningful engagement has also been ordered as part of a
structural interdict at the High Court level. In NAWONGO 199 the
93 Van der Berg (n 50). Participatory remedies must be preceded by strong,
substantively interpreted rights during the application of a capabilities-based
standard of review. Rodríguez-Garavito (n 62) 1691-1692. 
94 B Ray ‘Proceduralisation’s triumph and engagement’s promise in socio-economic
rights litigation’ (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 107 116-120
argues that engagement, if properly developed and institutionalised, can
constitute an effective tool for the poor with which to vindicate their socio-
economic rights. Once institutionalised, an order of meaningful engagement will
gradually become less resource intensive. 
95 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). The remedy of meaningful engagement was foreshadowed
in Grootboom (n 28) para 87. 
96 Port Elizabeth Municipality (n 95) para 39. 
97 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC).
98 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road (n 97) para 16. 
99 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations
v MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2010] ZAFSHC 73 (5 August 2010)
(NAWONGO 1). Three further orders were made: National Association of Welfare
Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v MEC for Social Development
(1719/2010) [2011] ZAFSHC 84 (9 June 2011) (NAWONGO 2); National
Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v MEC for
Social Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2013] ZAFSHC 49 (28 March 2013)
(NAWONGO 3); and National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-
Governmental Organisations v Member of the Executive Council for Social
Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2014] ZAFSHC 127 (28 August 2014)
(NAWONGO 4) where the allocative policy was finally upheld as constitutional.
308                                                             (2019) 19 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
Court issued a structural interdict aimed at bringing the Free State
Department of Social Development’s funding policy for the funding of
non-profit organisations (NPOs) that provide social welfare services to
those in need in the province in line with its constitutional and
statutory obligations. In NAWONGO 2 the Court ordered the state to
meaningfully engage with the under-funded NPOs in order to bring
its funding policy in line with its constitutional obligations.100
However, when NAWONGO 3 came before the Court, the state had
not complied with the engagement order. The state’s failure to
engage with the NPOs and thereby broaden the information available
to it was consequently reflected in its still constitutionally deficient
funding policy. In castigating the state for its non-compliance, the
Court emphasised that ‘[m]eaningful engagement is a minimum
required for formulating social welfare policy’101 and, as the facts of
the case show, for socio-economic allocative policies as well. One
factor leading to the ineffective design of a constitutional allocative
policy in this case was thus likely the state’s failure to engage with a
broad range of stakeholders. 
Meaningful engagement thus can be used as a mechanism to
identify which capabilities are at stake. Once this information is
known, allocative decisions can be revised accordingly. 
4.1.3 Informational broadening within different spheres and organs 
of state 
In Grootboom the need for co-operation between different spheres of
government in their efforts to realise socio-economic rights was
highlighted.102 As observed by Pillay, a breakdown in communication
between different spheres of government following the order in
Grootboom resulted in uncertainty regarding who bore the
responsibility for resource allocation, and consequently in ineffective
allocative decisions.103 The requirement for informational broadening
therefore requires different spheres of government and organs of state
to co-operate and share information. 
The duty of different organs of state to co-operate inter se has
subsequently been emphasised by the Constitutional Court in several
cases in which the right to education was implicated.104 In Rivonia
Primary School105 the Court repeated the need for ‘proper
100 NAWONGO 2 (n 99) para 28 order 2.
101 NAWONGO 3 (n 99) para 15.
102 Grootboom (n 28) para 68. 
103 K Pillay ‘Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the enforcement of socio-
economic rights’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 255 267-268.
104 Sec 29 of the Constitution. Head of Department, Department of Education, Free
State Province v Welkom High School; Head of Department, Department of Education,
Free State Province v Harmony High School 2014 (2) SA 228 (CC); MEC for Education
in Gauteng Province & Others v Governing Body of Rivonia Primary School 2013 (6)
SA 582 (CC). 
105 Rivonia Primary School (n 104).
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engagement between all parties affected’,106 and highlighted ‘the
damage that results when some functionaries fail to take the general
obligation to act in partnership and co-operation seriously’.107 Inter-
governmental co-operation where complex, polycentric resource
allocation decisions are concerned is of similarly critical importance.
This is confirmed by the very raison d’être of the Intergovernmental
Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997, the purpose of which is stated to be
‘[t]o promote co-operation between the national, provincial and local
spheres of government on fiscal, budgetary and financial matters’.108
When different departments of state need to engage with each other
on macro-economic matters in order to remediate unreasonable
resource allocation decisions,109 informational broadening among
different spheres of government and organs of state becomes
imperative in terms of a capabilities approach to remedies.110 
Participation at the remedial stage of adjudication thus fosters the
fundamental constitutional values of openness and responsiveness,111
while forming an indispensable component of a capabilities approach
to remedies. To furthermore foster the value of accountability and
promote a culture of justification, a capabilities approach to remedies
additionally requires explicitness. 
4.2 Explicitness 
A capabilities approach to the adjudication of state resource allocation
decisions demands explicit reasoning when making evaluative
judgments regarding the weighting and prioritisation of diverse
capabilities and other interests.112 Explicitness in the adjudicative
process further resonates with the demands of a culture of justification
under South Africa’s transformative Constitution.113 Explicit normative
parameters can aid the state in understanding its constitutional
obligations and enable it to devise an effective allocative plan. By also
requiring the state to explicitly indicate its progress in formulating and
implementing a remedial plan, accountability is fostered. In Magidimisi
106 Rivonia Primary School para 72.
107 Rivonia Primary School para 74. S Liebenberg ‘Deepening democratic
transformation in South Africa through participatory constitutional remedies’
(2015) National Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming).
108 Preamble to the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act.
109 See Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 (4) SA 274 (GP) para
80 where the Court acknowledged that, while difficult, a case could arguably be
made to challenge vote allocations in the national budget.
110 The involvement of, eg, the National Treasury where critical socio-economic
capabilities are imperilled by unreasonable resource allocation is of crucial
importance. See, eg, Madzodzo (n 82) para 3; Treasury Regulations GN R556 in
GG 21249 of 31 May 2000 as amended by GN R225 in GG 27388 of 15 March
2005. 
111 Sec 1(d) Constitution. 
112 Sen (1999) (n 3) 75. For the importance of explicitness under a transformative
constitution, see Van der Berg (2017) (n 8) 576. 
113 Mureinik (n 13) 32; Pieterse (n 18) 156, 161, 165. 
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NO v The Premier of the Eastern Cape114 the High Court elucidated the
benefits of structural interdicts:115
[Structural interdicts] have contributed to a better understanding on the
part of public authorities of their constitutional legal obligations in
particular areas, whilst it has also assisted the judiciary in gaining a valuable
insight in the difficulties that these authorities encounter in their efforts to
comply with their duties.
To constitute a capabilities approach to remedies, explicitness should
therefore be observed both by a court in granting a structural
interdict and by the state in devising a new allocative plan subject to
approval by the relevant court. 
4.2.1 Judicial explicitness
A participatory remedy directed at informational broadening in itself
may not constitute effective relief. A capabilities approach to remedies
requires meaningful engagement and similar procedural remedies to
be accompanied by explicit normative guidelines and the retention of
judicial supervision.116 Liebenberg argues for the provision of explicit
normative guidelines where meaningful engagement is ordered:117
If not combined with sufficient normative interpretative guidance on what
the particular constitutional right requires of the duty-bearers, other groups
similarly placed may not be able to derive the systemic benefits which
should flow from constitutional rights litigation ... The potential radiating
benefits of constitutional litigation will not be generated as organs of state
will be left with insufficient guidance regarding the normative parameters
and objectives of engagement processes – parameters and objectives
which should be inextricably linked to the substantive interests and values
which the relevant rights were designed to protect.
By combining an explicit order with an ongoing process of
participation and the retention of supervision, provision is also made
for the adaptation of the order in light of information yielded by the
process of engagement described above. Michelman explains
revisability in the context of democratic experimentalism:118
As the discursive benchmarking moves along and the emerging answers
gain public recognition and authorization, the court might turn up the
heat on deployment of its powers of review. At a relatively early stage, what
114 2006 JDR 0346 (B). 
115 Magidimisi (n 114) para 32.
116 See Liebenberg (n 107). See further L Chenwi ‘A new approach to remedies in
socio-economic rights adjudication: Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of
Johannesburg and Others’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 371 389-391 for
criticism of the Constitutional Court’s failure to set normative parameters and its
‘sheer unwillingness’ to make determinations on substantive issues in Olivia Road
(n 98). 
117 Liebenberg (n 107).
118 FI Michelman ‘Constitutionally binding social and economic rights as a compelling
idea: Reciprocating perturbations in liberal and democratic constitutional visions’
in HA García, K Klare & LA Williams (eds) Social and economic rights in theory and
practice (2015) 277 288-289.
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the court presumes to dictate will be agendas of questions to be addressed
and answered by one or another stakeholder group or class. At later stages,
the court starts calling for substantive compliance with the emergent best-
practice standards … The screws tighten on what can count as cogent or
‘reasonable’. The court serves as arbiter but it never has or claims a door-
closing last word.
The need for the reassessment of initial judgments regarding the
effective realisation of capabilities is also recognised by Sen, who
acknowledges that initially unforeseen consequences may need to be
addressed.119 The requirements for explicitness and informational
broadening through participatory processes thus dynamically interact
with each other. This symbiotic relationship can be catered for by the
ongoing nature of the structural interdict. 
In its meaningful engagement jurisprudence, the South African
Constitutional Court has sought to provide explicit parameters to
guide the engagement between government and affected parties,
especially in the housing context. In Residents of Joe Slovo Community,
Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes120 (Joe Slovo) the Court issued a
detailed supervisory order that sought to regulate the minutia of the
ultimate objects of the process of meaningful engagement in casu. As
Ray observes, Joe Slovo enabled courts to control the meaningful
engagement agenda.121 
In Section 27 v Minister of Basic Education122 the High Court was
approached in an attempt to solve the structural failure to realise the
right to basic education in the Limpopo province. In casu, the
widespread non-delivery of textbooks to schools was at issue. The
Court commenced its judgment by elaborating the normative
importance of the right to education. Importantly, the Court
recognised that education was vital for people to be able to reach
their potential, and contributed to the general upliftment of
society.123 Having provided a rich normative framework for the
adjudication of the matter at issue, the Court held that the
Department of Basic Education’s failure to deliver textbooks to schools
in Limpopo constituted an infringement of the right to basic
education.124 The Court proceeded to grant the relief requested by
the applicants in the form of a detailed structural interdict, which
included ordering the department to devise a comprehensive
remedial plan to address the severe educational shortcomings that
resulted from a lack of textbooks. Without prescribing the content of
the plan, the Court provided explicit guidelines outlining the contours
119 Sen (2009) (n 3) 106. 
120 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC). 
121 Ray (n 95) 112. See further Van der Berg (n 50). 
122 2013 (2) SA 40 (GNP). 
123 Section 27 (n 122) paras 1-4. 
124 Section 27 para 32. 
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of the plan.125 In providing these explicit guidelines, the Court’s
approach was wholly congruent with a capabilities approach to
remedies. However, the department did not comply with the initial
order and a further order was necessitated. Nonetheless, the implicit
utilisation of a capabilities approach to remedies yielded valuable
structural benefits such as the mobilisation of public opinion,
shedding light on the crisis in education experienced in South Africa,
and highlighting accountability and efficiency deficits in
government.126
Even where state compliance cannot be guaranteed, a capabilities
approach to remedies transforms a court into a deliberative platform
where government action can be subjected to public scrutiny.
Explicitness in the form of substantive, normative reasoning is critical
for the promotion of meaningful public scrutiny, debate and
subsequent mobilisation of non-judicial actors. A capabilities approach
to remedies can thus facilitate structural reform, even if it is initially
ineffective in extracting compliance from a recalcitrant
government.127 
4.2.2 State explicitness
Just as a reviewing court should adhere to the capabilities tenet of
explicit reasoning, the state also should explicitly indicate how its
remedial allocative plan complies with a relevant court order. Hlophe v
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality128 is an example of the
state failing to display explicitness in its remedial action. In this case
the City of Johannesburg was obliged to provide alternative
accommodation to residents of a privately-owned building prior to
eviction.129 The matter came to be heard by Satchwell J following the
City’s non-compliance with two previous court orders.130 Both
previous orders had required the City to provide detailed reports
125 F Veriava The 2012 Limpopo textbook crisis: A study in rights-based advocacy, the
raising of rights consciousness and governance (2013) 38.
126 As above.
127 In contrast, when the issue of textbook delivery again came before the Court in
Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 (4) SA 274 (GP), the Court
declined to issue a structural interdict. Given the litigation history in this matter,
the recalcitrance and intransigence of the Department and the implication of a
fertile capability (the deprivation of which can have dire consequences for the
freedom, dignity and equality of learners without textbooks), the Court’s
approach in casu eschews a capabilities approach to remedies and cannot be
supported. 
128 2013 (4) SA 212 (GSJ).
129 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty)
Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) confirmed the state’s obligation to provide alternative
accommodation where people are evicted from privately-owned buildings. 
130 Hlophe v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality GSJ 12-06-2012 Case
20127/2011 and Hlophe v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality GSJ
13-02-2013 Case 48103/2012 and 20127/2011.
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regarding the ‘nature and location’ of the temporary accommodation
the City was obliged to provide.131 However, the City concluded in its
first resulting report that it would be impossible for it to comply with
the order to provide alternative accommodation due to ‘the lack of
available buildings and financial and other resources’.132 The second
order133 again required the City to file a further report, and stated in
detail what information the report was to contain.134 When the City
responded by filing another inadequate report, Satchwell J proceeded
to condemn the lack of explicitness displayed by the City:135
[T]he City was ordered to detail certain specified information viz ‘the
nature and location of the accommodation to be provided’. This both
reports failed to do. General elucidation of accommodation provided to
other persons is of no assistance to the court; information about other
buildings which are not available for use in housing these occupiers does
not take resolution of this matter any further; mission and vision and policy
development are irrelevant to the particular task ordered by the court;
budgetary and asset constraints were not sought by the court.
The Court accordingly ordered a further report to be filed, and spelled
out the minutiae of what the report should contain in the hope that
explicit instructions ‘might focus the minds of both politicians and
functionaries on the work needed to be done by the City to meet its
Constitutional obligations’.136 The City finally responded by tendering
alternative accommodation.137 Unfortunately, whereas recalcitrance
on the part of the state is the most common justification for granting
a structural interdict, neither explicitness – nor effectiveness – can
always be extracted from intransigent officials. 
The City subsequently lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court of
Appeal claiming that a mandamus directing functionaries to perform
their constitutional obligations is never appropriate.138 The Supreme
Court of Appeal rejected this argument139 but proceeded to set aside
the detailed reporting order issued by Satchwell J on the basis that
only the nature and location of alternative accommodation were at
issue before the court a quo.140 However, the Supreme Court of
Appeal’s further finding that the reporting order breached the
131 Hlophe (n 130) para 11.
132 Hlophe para 13.
133 Hlophe (n 130).
134 Hlophe para 15.
135 Hlophe para 21.
136 Hlophe para 27. An interim order to meaningfully engage with the applicants was
issued in Hlophe (n 130).
137 For a summary of this protracted litigation, see SERI ‘Hlophe and Others v City of
Johannesburg and Others (“Hlophe”)’ (2013) SERI-SA http://www.seri-sa.org/
index.php/19-litigation/case-entries/196-hlophe-and-others-v-city-of-
johannesburg-and-others-hlophe (accessed 15 September 2014). 
138 Respondent’s heads of argument in City of Johannesburg v Hlophe SCA Case 1035/
2014. 
139 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA)
para 26.
140 City of Johannesburg para 27.
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separation of powers in that it purported ‘to give directions to the City
in respect of what is required to comply with its constitutional
obligations to provide temporary accommodation to homeless
persons in general’ cannot be supported.141 
4.3 Supervision
The effectiveness of a remedy can be assessed by determining to what
extent it can realise the capabilities underlying the infringed socio-
economic right. Capability realisation, therefore, is the measure
against which the effectiveness of a remedy can be judged. In Fose142
the Constitutional Court echoed the need for effective remedies:143
In our context an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, for
without effective remedies for breach, the values underlying and the rights
entrenched in the Constitution cannot properly be upheld or enhanced ...
The courts have a particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to
‘forge new tools’ and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this
goal.
By adopting a capabilities approach to remedies, courts are able to
discharge their responsibility by shaping innovative, effective
remedies. However, participatory processes aimed at informational
broadening and explicit reasoning are not sufficient. In addition, the
retention of supervision is a crucial element of an effective remedy.144 
Supervisory jurisdiction is not only justified where the state has
demonstrated intransigence, but also where basic socio-economic
capabilities are imperilled by unreasonable resource allocation
decisions. Without an effective remedy, ‘irremediable’ damage can
result to those whose capabilities are being deprived as a result of the
right-infringement.145 By monitoring the various participatory
processes aimed at informational broadening, courts can ensure that
relevant capabilities and concomitant allocative needs are properly
identified in a situation of bargaining parity.146 Furthermore, the
continued involvement of the court allows it to adapt its orders based
on the information that comes to light during the process of
engagement. Supervision is also necessary to ensure that revised
resource allocation decisions are not only aimed at capability
realisation for the parties to the litigation, but also to others similarly
situated.147 
Courts can accordingly discharge their constitutional duty to devise
effective remedies by compelling the state to report back to the court
141 City of Johannesburg para 28. 
142 Fose (n 88).
143 Fose (n 88) para 69 (my emphasis). 
144 Rodríguez-Garavito (n 62) 1691-1692. The retention of supervision is made
possible by the broad provision made for remedies in sec 172 of the Constitution
and by sec 8 of PAJA.
145 Roach & Budlender (n 45) 334.
146 Liebenberg (n 107).
147 As above. 
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regarding the steps it has taken to formulate reasonable allocative
decisions in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders. Such
plans must be made subject to judicial approval, and should facilitate
further public scrutiny. In Allpay II148 a reporting back order, and not
a structural interdict, was granted. State reports thus were not
subjected to judicial approval. The subsequent discharge of judicial
supervision, based on false reassurances provided by the Department
of Social Development, almost led to a catastrophe in social grant
administration,149 thereby highlighting the crucial importance of
retained judicial supervision where systemic socio-economic rights
infringements are at issue. In appropriate cases, a court may revise its
order and adapt its initial explicit normative guidelines in light of the
information garnered during the process of engagement. Where
participatory processes have not been sufficiently adhered to, a court
can issue explicit instructions compelling the state to rectify defects in
relation to its engagement efforts. In so doing, the state can remedy
any lacunae in its allocative plan that resulted from the participation
deficit in the engagement process. 
Where the state files a report regarding its progress in formulating
and implementing reasonable resource allocation decisions, other
stakeholders should be granted the first opportunity to comment on
such a report. This may to some extent alleviate the supervising
court’s burden. The assistance of organisations or ad hoc
commissions150 may also be solicited in order to supervise the
implementation of the order, with the court only approving plans or
issuing further directions at protracted intervals.151 The retention of
supervision can thus catalyse a truly collaborative partnership between
the courts, the state, and all stakeholders that have an interest in
reasonable resource allocation decisions aimed at socio-economic
capability realisation. 
5 Conclusion 
A capabilities approach to remedies postulates relief that may
effectively vindicate the capabilities underlying a socio-economic right
that was infringed upon through disproportionate resource allocation.
The effectiveness of a remedy thus can be assessed against the
148 Allpay II (n 1). 
149 Black Sash I (n 1).
150 For the use of commissions in India to monitor the implementation of remedies,
see Bhagwati (n 84) 575-577; Cassels (n 84) 500 506. 
151 A supervising court must explicitly define roles and functions to avoid the
confusion that resulted when the South African Human Rights Commission agreed
to ‘monitor’ state compliance with its constitutional obligations in the wake of the
judgment in Grootboom (n 28). See Pillay (n 29) 14. See further M Ebadolahi
‘Using structural interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission to
achieve the judicial enforcement of economic and social rights in South Africa’
(2008) 83 New York University Law Review 1565 1602-1605. 
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measure of capability realisation. Furthermore, in this article it was
argued that a capabilities approach to remedies requires the
incorporation of three features that interact with each other in the
common pursuit of ensuring effectiveness. These are participation
aimed at broadening the information available to the court and the
state for the formulation of an effective remedy; explicitness in the
provision of normative guidelines by the court and the formulation of
a remedial plan by the state; and the retention of supervision by the
court. It was further shown that the structural interdict can be
designed so as to include all three these crucial capabilities-based
features. 
Moreover, a capabilities approach to the design of a structural
interdict is capable of substantially addressing concerns that courts are
constitutionally and institutionally incompetent fora for the
adjudication of polycentric resource allocation decisions. The
capabilities precept to broaden the information available to the state
to the greatest extent possible in revising its allocative decisions grants
the state sufficient latitude to devise its own allocative plans within its
spheres of competence. A court thus provides normative parameters
in which such remediation must occur, but leaves the details of
allocative decisions to the branches of government best equipped to
grapple with matters of resource allocation. Furthermore, the
flexibility inherent in a participatory remedy coupled with on-going
judicial supervision enables polycentric consequences to be dealt with
sequentially, as they arise. Polycentric effects are also minimised in
proportion to the range of interests identified and represented
through a process of informational broadening. 
A capabilities approach to remedies thus aims at institutionalising
capabilities-focused resource allocation decisions for the benefit of all
those whose socio-economic rights remain unfulfilled. 
